Cyber Diplomacy Evolves as the “Global South” Secures Its Voice

At the September 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping proclaimed the “collective rise of the Global South” as a defining feature of today’s geopolitical transformation. While emphasising China’s leadership, Xi underscored that Beijing would not abandon the interests of developing countries—a message aimed at rallying emerging economies around an alternative to the U.S.-led liberal order. That same gathering saw India, Brazil, and South Africa join China, Russia, and others in a BRICS+ framework that signalled a clear desire for a multipolar world.

From Unipolar Cyberspace to Contested Domain
The internet’s earliest days coincided with the United States’ unchallenged supremacy. Entrenched notions of a borderless, free-market internet flourished under a multi-stakeholder model, with minimal state regulation. Yet by the mid-2000s—after incursions like the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia and the discovery of Stuxnet—the geopolitical stakes of cyberspace became evident. Russia and China began advocating for a state-centric vision, seeking binding international treaties and multilateral governance to safeguard national security and social order online.

Cyber Diplomacy Emerges as a Distinct Field

• Initial Focus on Arms Control (Late 1990s–2000s): In 1999, Russia proposed an international treaty banning information weapons. The UN’s Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on ICT security, launched in 2004, initially centred on arms control among great powers.
• Broadening Participation: Over successive GGE iterations and forums like the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and ICANN, mid-sized states—South Africa, Brazil, Kenya—began asserting priorities: capacity building, internet access, and development goals.
• Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) & Ad Hoc Committee (AHC): To break GGE deadlock, the UN established an OEWG in 2021 and, in 2022, an AHC to draft a global cybercrime convention (adopted in December 2024). These processes, open to all 193 UN member states and civil society observers, democratized debates once dominated by Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.

Status Quo Defenders vs. Revisionists vs. Swing States
Analysts increasingly categorize states into three blocs:

• Status Quo Defenders: Led by the United States and allies, advocating voluntary norms, multi-stakeholder governance, and existing international law.
• Revisionists: Headed by Russia and China, pressing for binding treaties and state-centric multilateral control.
• Swing States (“Digital Deciders”): Emerging powers—India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa—whose positions are fluid. These “Global South” countries resist ideological extremes and often seek a third path that safeguards their developmental and security interests.

Conceptualizing the “Global South” in Cyberspace
Though geographically imprecise, the “Global South” metaphor captures a cohort of developing nations historically marginalized by colonialism and low on the global wealth pyramid. In cyber diplomacy, these countries demonstrate three defining behaviours:

1. Ideological Agnosticism: Many refrain from choosing definitively between U.S. and Sino-Russian proposals, instead remaining neutral on contentious issues like the nature of cyberspace governance. Exceptions include Iran and North Korea, which align with Moscow and Beijing.
2. Selective Engagement: When developmental or national interests are at stake—such as equitable data flows—the Global South mobilizes. At the UN’s Global Digital Compact talks, the G77+China group pressed for transparent, inclusive digital policies that promote socioeconomic gains.
3. Multi-Alignment Diplomacy: Distrustful of over-reliance on any single power, these states cultivate partnerships with both Western tech firms and Chinese suppliers. They balk at exclusive technology bans—such as U.S. efforts to curb Huawei—arguing that Western surveillance within Five Eyes countries undermines moral high ground.

From Margins to the Mainstage
The Global South’s footprint in cyber diplomacy has expanded through:

• UN OEWG and AHC Participation: Open-ended forums invite all UN members, empowering African, Latin American, and Asian nations to shape norms on state conduct in cyberspace.
• Regional Coalitions and Minilateral Forums: Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship, India’s G20 presidency, and Brazil’s leadership in BRICS+ host side-discussions on digital capacity building and cybercrime conventions.
• Civil Society Engagement: NGOs from the Global South collaborate with tech companies and law-enforcement agencies to craft practical guidelines on encryption, data protection, and digital inclusion.

Challenges Ahead: Will the Global South Maintain Collective Agency?
Three factors will determine whether the Global South remains a unified force in internet governance:

1. Domestic Cyber Policies: Ideological consistency on digital rights, data privacy, and net neutrality will test whether governments can align national regulations with collective stances.
2. Resistance to Great Power Pressure: Balancing ties with Washington and Beijing—from satellite communications to 5G infrastructure—will challenge the Global South’s autonomy.
3. Regional Leadership and Solidarity: Emerging powers like India, Brazil, and South Africa must articulate positions that advance the broader developing-world agenda, rather than prioritize narrow national interests or regime stability.

Conclusion: A Third Path in Cyberspace Governance
As the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies online, the rise of cyber diplomacy across the Global South offers a potential “third way”—one that emphasizes development, equitable data flows, and multi-stakeholder inclusivity without blind allegiance to any bloc. Yet this “mood” of collective agency must evolve into sustained institutional influence. If the Global South can navigate great-power overtures and domestic divisions, it may shape a more balanced digital ecosystem that privileges security, innovation, and social justice. Otherwise, cyber diplomacy risks fracturing into national silos—a far cry from the solidarity Xi Jinping celebrated in Kazan.

Looking Ahead
In late 2025, negotiations will resume under the UN OEWG to finalize voluntary cyber norms. Simultaneously, the Ad Hoc Committee’s draft cybercrime convention enters legal review. How developing countries vote, propose amendments, and collaborate in these venues will reveal whether the Global South can turn rhetorical “mood” into enduring diplomatic architecture—ensuring that cyberspace governance truly reflects the diverse needs of the world’s majority.

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