China’s foreign ministry has retaliated sharply against US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s keynote at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, accusing him of “villifying China with defamatory allegations” and deliberately “sowing division” across the Asia-Pacific region. Hegseth’s address on May 31, 2025, warned regional governments that Beijing might be “credibly preparing to use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific” and urged Asian countries to boost defence spending. In its official response on June 1, China described Hegseth’s comments as “filled with provocations,” decried his alleged “cold war mentality,” and accused the United States of hypocrisy in branding China a “hegemonic power.”
Hegseth’s Warnings of an ‘Imminent’ Chinese Threat
At the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security summit—widely regarded as Asia’s premier defence forum—Pete Hegseth used his podium to issue one of the sternest public warnings to date about China’s military intentions. He asserted that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was “rehearsing for the real deal” of potentially invading Taiwan and cautioned that Beijing’s expanding capabilities posed an “imminent threat” to the region’s stability.
“There is no reason to sugar-coat it,” Hegseth told assembled defence ministers, military chiefs, and security experts. “The threat China poses is real, and it could be imminent. We have observed increasing grey-zone activities, militarisation of disputed outposts, and coercive actions designed to intimidate neighbours. We must not pretend these developments are benign.”
Drawing on publicly available satellite imagery and open-source intelligence, Hegseth cited the rapid construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, the deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing fleet of fourth-generation fighter jets as evidence of China’s strategic calculus. He urged US allies and partners—including Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—to “increase defence spending to at least 2 percent of GDP” to bolster deterrence and ensure that Beijing “cannot miscalculate our resolve.”
Hegseth also announced a series of new US initiatives designed to deepen military cooperation in the region. Among them were expanded US ship-and-plane repair facilities in Australia, plans to establish a P-8A anti-submarine warfare maintenance hub in Darwin, and intentions to conduct the first live-fire test of a mid-range capability system on Australian soil in coming months.
Beijing’s Immediate and Forceful Rebuttal
Within 24 hours of Hegseth’s speech, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strongly worded statement condemning the US defence secretary for his “provocative” assertions. The statement, published on the ministry’s website and widely circulated through Chinese state media, accused Hegseth of discarding “the call for peace and development by countries in the region” in favour of “touting a cold war mentality for bloc confrontation.”
“Hegseth deliberately ignored the call for peace and development by countries in the region, and instead touted the cold war mentality for bloc confrontation, vilified China with defamatory allegations, and falsely labelled China a ‘threat,’” the ministry said.
“There is no country in the world deserving of the label ‘hegemonic power’ more than the United States itself, which remains the primary factor undermining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific,” it added. “Hegseth’s remarks were filled with provocations and intended to sow division. China strongly protests such irresponsible behaviour.”
Beijing also accused Hegseth of “playing with fire” on the sensitive issue of Taiwan. The PRC claims Taiwan as a renegade province to be reunified, by force if necessary, despite Taipei’s democratically elected government and the majority consensus among Taiwanese citizens for maintaining de facto independence. The foreign ministry reiterated that any external interference in the “Taiwan question” would be met with “resolute countermeasures.”
The statement concluded with an appeal to Asian governments to resist “malicious instigation” from external powers and instead pursue “win-win cooperation” under the principles of mutual respect, peaceful development, and regional multilateralism.
Regional Reactions: Australia’s Defence Minister Rejects China’s Criticism
In Singapore’s Suntec Convention Centre on Sunday morning, Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles rebuffed China’s accusation that Hegseth’s comments were divisive. Speaking to reporters after a bilateral side-meeting with counterparts from ASEAN member states, Marles described China’s defence build-up as unprecedented.
“What we have seen from China is the single biggest increase in military capability and build-up in a conventional sense by any country since the end of the Second World War,” Marles said. “That is one of the key features of the complexity of the strategic landscape which all of us face within the region and which is faced around the world.”
Marles also emphasised that Australia has worked closely with regional partners, including the United States and the Philippines, to uphold the rules-based international order—particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which enshrines freedom of navigation in international waters. Although the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and most ASEAN states are bound by its provisions.
“Australia remains committed to the freedoms and norms that have underpinned decades of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific,” Marles said. “We will continue to work with our partners to ensure that no single power can unilaterally rewrite the rules at sea.”
China’s Delegation and Hu Gangfeng’s Counterpoints
In a departure from previous years, Beijing sent only a small delegation to the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue. Instead of China’s defence minister or senior generals, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was represented by Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng, vice-president of the PLA National Defence University. Hu appeared on a Sunday panel with UK Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin and Japan’s Vice-Minister for Defence Akihisa Nagashima.
Hu seized the opportunity to push back against criticisms leveled by Hegseth and other speakers. He accused unnamed countries of “provoking confrontations in the region” and infringing upon the territorial sovereignty of Asian nations under the guise of “freedom of navigation.” More pointedly, he condemned countries—widely understood to be the United States and its allies—for supporting “Taiwan independence separatist forces,” which Beijing views as a direct challenge to its territorial integrity.
“The maritime situation in the region is generally stable but faces severe challenges,” Hu told the audience. “Some nations have increased their military presence and intruded into others’ waters in the name of so-called freedom of navigation and have supported Taiwan independence separatists. This is irresponsible, provocative, and risks undermining regional peace and stability.”
Hu reiterated China’s official position that its claims in the South China Sea are lawful, citing historical evidence and maps dating back centuries. He dismissed the 2016 arbitral ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague—which invalidated China’s “nine-dash line” claims—as a “political farce” with no binding power over Beijing.
The Taiwan Question: A Red Line for Beijing
Much of the heat in Hegseth’s speech centered on Taiwan, which China considers its “core interest.” Hegseth warned that Beijing was conducting large-scale military drills near the Taiwan Strait and refining plans for a possible amphibious invasion. He cited Chinese state media and military white papers that touted reunification as an “inevitable mission.” The minister urged allied governments to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons, particularly air defence systems and submarines, to strengthen Taipei’s asymmetric capabilities.
“There is no path to peace by naively assuming that Beijing’s long-term ambitions have changed,” Hegseth said. “If China believes it can seize Taiwan by force before the world can respond effectively, they will do so. We must remove any doubt about our willingness to defend democracy in Taipei.”
China’s foreign ministry statement retorted that accusations of hostile intent toward Taiwan were “nothing more than an attempt to mislead public opinion and manufacture confrontations.” It reiterated that the Taiwan question was exclusively China’s internal affair, warning that any “external interference”—a veiled reference to US arms sales and high-level meetings between US and Taiwanese officials—would “invite severe consequences.”
Historical Context: US-China Security Frictions at Shangri-La
The Shangri-La Dialogue, hosted annually by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), has long served as a bellwether of US-China security tensions. In 2018, US Defence Secretary James Mattis and Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe shared the same podium for a rare bilateral exchange, emphasizing the need for “responsible management” of differences. The following year, Admiral Philip Davidson and Admiral Shen Jinlong—heads of the US Indo-Pacific Command and the PLA Navy, respectively—met on the sidelines to discuss maritime confidence-building measures.
However, under the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” approach, the US rail-roading of trade wars also bled into defence cooperation. In 2019, China reduced its delegation to a lower rank, sending Vice-Minister Zhang Yong rather than Defence Minister Wei. Observers noted that Beijing’s decision to send low-ranking officials in 2025—only Rear Admiral Hu Gangfeng—signaled a cooling of military-to-military trust.
Hegseth’s Push for Increased Defence Spending
In calling on Asian nations to boost their defence budgets—Hegseth specifically named Australia, Japan, South Korea, and India—he emphasized that regional partners must shoulder a greater share of security burdens. Australia’s defence spending stood at 2.1% of GDP in 2024, above the NATO benchmark of 2% but still low compared to the United States (3.5%). Japan allocated roughly 1.1%, South Korea 2.7%, and India 2.9%.
“Deterrence does not come on the cheap,” Hegseth said. “Strengthening our collective security requires modernising forces, integrating defence industries, and conducting joint exercises. Time is of the essence.”
The US has already accelerated transfers of advanced weapons systems to Japan (including F-35A stealth fighters), expanded access to repair and maintenance facilities for Australian P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and conducted trilateral naval exercises with India in the Indian Ocean. Hegseth announced plans to deepen defence industrial cooperation, citing joint production of next-generation radar systems with Japan and collaborative development of hypersonic weapons with Australia.
China decried these efforts as “military alliances designed to contain China,” echoing long-standing complaints that US alliances and “Indo-Pacific Strategies” aim to encircle Beijing.
ASEAN’s Delicate Balancing Act
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—comprising ten countries with sometimes conflicting stances on China and the US—watched Hegseth’s speech and Beijing’s subsequent reaction with cautious ambivalence. Southeast Asia has deep economic ties with both superpowers: China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly 16% of intra-ASEAN trade in 2024, while the United States remains a top investor in manufacturing and services across the region.
Several ASEAN foreign ministers, who remained off the record at Shangri-La, described Hegseth’s remarks as “alarmist” and not conducive to dialogue. They warned against framing the strategic competition as a binary choice between Washington and Beijing. However, others—particularly the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia—acknowledged that China’s maritime activities in the South China Sea have grown more assertive, citing arrests of Vietnamese fishermen, the placement of surveillance facilities on contested rocks, and recurring “dangerous manoeuvres” by the PLA Navy.
“We must avoid being forced into choosing sides,” an unnamed ASEAN diplomat told Guardian Australia. “Our priority is to maintain proper management of disputes, uphold UNCLOS, and ensure that any concerns—be they Chinese or American—are addressed through ASEAN mechanisms or dialogue platforms.”
In remarks to the press on Sunday, Singapore’s Minister for Defence Chan Chun Sing exhorted all parties—especially China—to use available forums to clarify their positions and avoid misunderstandings. Chan lamented China’s minimal presence at the summit, saying Beijing should leverage occasions like Shangri-La to “communicate directly with regional partners, rather than relying solely on state media or secondhand messaging.” He cautioned that failing to engage “increases the risk of misinterpretation, miscalculation, and misrepresentation—an outcome that is dangerous for all of us.”
US Congressional Response and Bipartisan Concern
Within the United States, reactions to Hegseth’s Asia speech varied between hawkish praise and pragmatic caution. Republican Senator Jim Risch of Idaho, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, lauded Hegseth’s remarks, stating: “The secretary delivered a clear warning that China must not be allowed to coerce its neighbours or pursue conquest.” Democratic Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut, however, acknowledged the seriousness of China’s military expansion while urging caution. “We need to avoid a self-fulfilling arms race,” Murphy said. “Our strategy should emphasise diplomacy, alliances, and targeted deterrence—rather than simply demanding everyone spend more. That has to be part of the equation.”
In the House of Representatives, a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced a resolution reaffirming US commitments to Article V of the Taiwan Relations Act, which obliges Congress to consider providing military aid to Taiwan to maintain its self-defence capabilities. While not explicitly mentioning Hegseth’s speech, the resolution echoed calls for “continued vigilance” against coercion in the Taiwan Strait and praised “efforts to strengthen partnerships with like-minded Indo-Pacific democracies.”
Implications for US-China Relations and Regional Stability
As Washington doubles down on alliance building and China rejects Western criticisms, observers warn that missteps by either side could trigger unintended escalation. Dr. Euan Graham, director for the Asia Pacific at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, noted:
“Hegseth’s speech reiterates familiar US talking points—Beijing is a threat, partners must spend more, alliances must deepen. Beijing’s reaction, accusing the US of hypocrisy, follows a well-worn script. But there is a danger: if diplomatic channels remain underutilised and messaging remains solely adversarial, perceptions will harden, leaving little room for crisis management in a flashpoint like the Taiwan Strait.”
Indeed, past decades have witnessed numerous near-crises: the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the 2001 EP-3 collision over the South China Sea, the 2018 US-China trade war—each event underscored how quickly tensions can escalate if trust erodes. This year’s Shangri-La Dialogue offered little evidence of thaw. Rather than high-profile US-China bilaterals—such as the landmark 2018 meeting between then-Defence Minister Wei Fenghe and Secretary James Mattis—this year saw only side conversations between Japanese and—where present—US officials. China’s absence of senior leadership delegations signalled reduced faith in the forum’s utility as a communication channel.
Looking Ahead: From Dialogue to Action
In the days following the Shangri-La Dialogue, regional capitals are likely to review defence budgets and update threat assessments. Australia, having faced the strongest Chinese military build-up since WWII and already planning to lift defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, must weigh the trade-off between deepening security ties with Washington and maintaining productive economic relations with Beijing. Japan and South Korea—both US treaty allies—are expected to accelerate procurement of Aegis Ashore missile defence systems and expand cooperation with US forces on ballistic missile defence. India, for its part, has invested in strengthening its QUAD partnerships (with the US, Japan, and Australia) and may expedite naval modernization, including the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities.
Several Southeast Asian nations, meanwhile, will navigate a narrow path—avoiding outright alignment with either superpower while quietly building defensive capacities. Vietnam’s recent purchase of Su-30MK2 jets and advanced surface-to-air missile systems, coupled with US-Vietnam naval exercises, exemplify this pragmatic hedging approach.
Conclusion: The Shape of Asia-Pacific Security in 2025
Pete Hegseth’s combative keynote at the Shangri-La Dialogue—and China’s vehement response—underscore a broader strategic contest in the Asia-Pacific. Both sides reaffirm their narratives: the United States insists it is defending democracy and open seas; China contends it is safeguarding territorial sovereignty and resisting containment. As the world’s two largest economies vie for influence, regional states face heightened uncertainty over which path guarantees peace and prosperity.
READ MORE: Pete Hegseth Urges Asian Allies to Increase Defence Spending Amid “Imminent” China Threat
Australia’s call for measured engagement—championed by Defence Minister Richard Marles—demonstrates that, for many countries, the imperative remains to uphold a rules-based order while avoiding polarization. Singapore’s Defence Minister Chan Chun Sing’s appeal for better communication highlights the need for dialogues, not diatribes.
In this evolving security landscape, Asia-Pacific nations must navigate between Washington’s alliance structures and Beijing’s economic gravitas—minimizing risks of miscalculation and armed conflict. The success of regional stability efforts will likely hinge on the capacity of all stakeholders to blend robust deterrence with constructive diplomacy. For now, however, Hegseth’s soundbites and China’s retorts remind us that where words flow freely, so too can tensions. As defence ministers depart Singapore and return to capital cities, their next moves—budget allocations, procurement decisions, and diplomatic outreach—will illustrate whether the region can bridge divides or remain ensnared in a spiral of suspicion.
