Nvidia’s longtime chief security officer, David Reber, left the company in August, and Saša Zdjelar took over the role. The transition has drawn fresh attention as questions grow about what Nvidia knew of U.S. scrutiny of Singapore data-center company Megaspeed and reports about CEO Jensen Huang’s relationships with employees. TechCrunch reports that no public evidence links the security leadership change to those matters, and Nvidia has not answered its questions about what the security team knew. [1]
The issue matters because corporate security can extend beyond cyberattacks and physical protection. Specialists interviewed by TechCrunch say personal relationships and business contacts may create openings for foreign intelligence services, while stressing that detecting such risks is difficult. The available reporting does not establish that Huang’s phone was compromised, that the security team received warnings, or that Reber’s departure was connected to the inquiries. [1]
What changed in Nvidia’s security leadership
Reber spent four years as Nvidia’s chief security officer and seven years at the company overall. In a LinkedIn post in late August, he said he was leaving for health reasons and disclosed that he had been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson’s more than two years earlier. “This wasn’t a pivot I had planned,” he wrote, adding that family and health needed to come first. [1]
His replacement, Zdjelar, had worked for 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston, where he left as a senior IT manager. He then spent a year at Salesforce and several years at cybersecurity company ReversingLabs. TechCrunch says Zdjelar did not respond to questions about the transition or the security team’s knowledge of the issues. Reber also did not respond, and Nvidia did not answer the publication’s related questions. [1]
That lack of response leaves a central question unresolved: whether information about Megaspeed or Huang’s reported relationships reached Nvidia’s security function. A change in leadership, on its own, does not show that the team missed a warning or that it had responsibility for handling one. TechCrunch explicitly says nothing public connects Reber’s or Zdjelar’s role changes to the Megaspeed matter. [1]
| When | Reported development | What it establishes |
|---|---|---|
| Late August | Reber announced his departure and cited health and family reasons. [1] | His stated reason for leaving, not a link to the later inquiries. |
| After Reber’s departure | Zdjelar took over as chief security officer. [1] | A leadership transition; his response to questions was not available. |
| More than a year before the report | Nvidia’s top lawyer was engaged with the government’s Megaspeed inquiry, according to a New York Times report cited by TechCrunch. [1] | Some senior company officials knew of the inquiry; it does not establish what security knew. |
| As the reports emerged | News reports described Huang’s relationships with Nvidia employees. [1] | Colleagues may have known some details; whether security was informed remains unclear. |
Why the questions reach beyond cybersecurity
Relationships between a chief executive and employees are generally handled by human resources, legal teams and a company’s board, rather than by security, the TechCrunch report notes. But security specialists say a private relationship can become a risk if an executive fears disclosure or pressure. That is a potential vulnerability, not proof that anyone used one against Huang. [1]
The Megaspeed issue is distinct from an internal workplace relationship. U.S. investigators suspect the Singapore data-center company of helping funnel Nvidia chips to China, according to TechCrunch. Megaspeed has denied wrongdoing. The report says Nvidia’s top lawyer had been engaged with the government’s inquiry more than a year earlier, while Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials. Those facts indicate government attention and company awareness at a senior level, but they do not show that Nvidia’s security team was briefed. [1]
TechCrunch also summarizes reporting by The New York Times and Reuters about Huang’s alleged relationships with employees. The Times cited five Nvidia employees who said Huang had a relationship with a vice president who reported directly to him. Reuters, citing two people, later reported a second relationship. The source article says Nvidia’s code of conduct does not expressly forbid the behavior described. These are media reports, not findings of an investigation, and the underlying accounts do not answer whether security staff were told. [1]
Retired senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades told TechCrunch that intelligence services often gather information through ordinary conversations, not only hacking. That can make risks hard for security teams to spot. He said corporate teams may also be underfunded or limited to a narrow brief, such as facilities, cyberattacks and physical threats. Eftimiades has written about Chinese espionage operations and tactics, and TechCrunch reports that he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals. [1][2]
In an opinion article in The Hill, corporate investigations executive Don Aviv and author Jeremy Hurewitz argued that companies should consider insider threats, suspicious business ties, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts. Their argument is that security needs a broader view than building access and network defense. It is a recommendation about corporate practice, not evidence about Nvidia’s actual security remit. [1][3]
What is known, and what remains unproven
For readers assessing the story, the distinction between reported facts and unanswered questions is important. The public material summarized by TechCrunch supports the leadership timeline, Reber’s stated health reason for leaving, and the existence of scrutiny around Megaspeed and reports about Huang’s relationships. It does not demonstrate a security failure, a foreign intelligence operation against Huang, or a causal link between the executive relationships and the chip investigation. [1]
Even if a security team learns of a potential vulnerability, its ability to act may depend on its remit, resources and access to senior decision-makers. Eftimiades told TechCrunch that intelligence services can seek policy insight, such as who is advocating for changes to export rules and who opposes them. He also described scenarios in which a person’s ordinary conversations could expose internal decision-making. Those observations describe general risks, not proof that they occurred at Nvidia. [1]
TechCrunch says Eftimiades discussed IMSI catchers, devices that imitate mobile phone towers so nearby phones connect to them. He described basic versions as costing about $1,000 and fitting in a suitcase, while government-grade models cost much more. The report does not say such a device was used against Huang. Eftimiades said it was not known whether these devices had been used against him, and that his phone was presumably hardened enough for compromises to be detected, if not necessarily prevented. [1]
The practical lesson for companies is to define who receives and assesses concerns that span workplace conduct, sensitive business relationships and foreign-intelligence risk. Security leaders can ask whether escalation routes are clear, whether the team’s remit includes insider and relationship-based threats, and whether executives and boards know how to raise concerns. These are general governance questions, not claims that Nvidia lacked such processes.
What to watch for next
The next confirmed developments depend on Nvidia’s board’s independent investigation and federal inquiries, which TechCrunch says are ongoing. Their findings may clarify what information company officials had and whether security could have acted on it. Until then, the key open question is what Nvidia’s security team knew, not whether the public record has already proved it failed. [1]
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Did Nvidia say its security team knew about the Megaspeed inquiry?
No. TechCrunch says Nvidia did not answer its questions about what the security team knew. It reports separately that Nvidia’s top lawyer had been engaged with the government inquiry more than a year earlier, citing The New York Times. [1]
Why did David Reber leave Nvidia?
Reber said in a late-August LinkedIn post that he was leaving for family and health reasons. He disclosed a diagnosis of young-onset Parkinson’s made more than two years earlier. No public evidence cited by TechCrunch connects his departure to the Megaspeed inquiry. [1]
Has reporting established that Huang was targeted or that his phone was compromised?
No. TechCrunch reports that Eftimiades said no one knows whether IMSI catchers were used against Huang. The article does not establish a phone compromise or an intelligence operation targeting him. [1]
References
- Loizos C. Where was Nvidia’s security team? TechCrunch [Internet]. 2026 Nov 15. Available from: https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/14/where-was-nvidias-security-team/
- Eftimiades N. Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics. 2020. Book cited in the TechCrunch report; publication details not provided in the source. [1]
- Aviv D, Hurewitz J. Opinion article on corporate security and insider threats. The Hill. Cited and summarized in the TechCrunch report; article title and URL not provided in the source. [1]
