The quest to maintain international peace and security has driven diplomatic efforts since the Thirty Years’ War and the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Yet permanent peace has remained elusive. Early peace conferences in The Hague at the turn of the 20th century and the post–World War II United Nations Charter sought to limit armaments and resolve conflicts. Today, the intensifying tension between Israel and Iran has exposed the limitations of existing frameworks—and has reignited debate over nuclear non-proliferation. This article examines the political underpinnings of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), its Cold War origins, and the ways in which the current Israelo-Iranian standoff reflects deeper fissures in the global order.
Historical Context: From Hague to United Nations
Count Muravyov’s proposals at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference to restrict armaments anticipated later disarmament efforts. The 1907 follow-up conference extended these goals but could not stave off the First World War, nor did the Treaty of Versailles prevent World War II. In the wake of that conflict, the United Nations Charter enshrined collective security as its cornerstone. Yet as Israel and Iran clash over nuclear capabilities, questions arise about whether the UN framework remains adequate—or whether reform is desperately needed.
The NPT: Text Versus Politics
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 in Moscow, entered into force in 1970, and was extended indefinitely in 1995. Its three pillars—non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy—reflect a bargain between Nuclear Weapon States (the five permanent UN Security Council members) and non-nuclear states. Signatories pledged not to acquire or spread nuclear arms, to pursue disarmament, and to facilitate civil nuclear cooperation.
Yet the politics of the NPT remain fraught. Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union spawned the treaty, but ideological competition limited genuine disarmament. The US-Soviet détente that produced the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) did not translate into mutual nuclear roll-back. Instead, both superpowers maintained vast arsenals while preventing new entrants to the nuclear club.
Cold War Legacy and Contemporary Rivalries
The original NPT regime was underpinned by superpower cooperation—even as Washington and Moscow competed for influence. Today, Russia under Vladimir Putin revives neo-Cold War tensions, blockading NATO’s eastward expansion and reproaching Western support for Ukraine. Simultaneously, the United States leverages its alliance with Israel to contain Iran. This binary opposition mirrors past ideological fault lines, suggesting that the global non-proliferation regime is as much a tool of great-power politics as it is a legal framework.
Israel and Iran: Non-Parties to the NPT
Neither Israel nor Iran is a party to the NPT, placing both outside its direct legal obligations. Israel maintains a policy of “nuclear ambiguity,” neither confirming nor denying an arsenal, yet widely recognized as the Middle East’s sole nuclear power. Iran, by contrast, insists its nuclear program is peaceful, though suspicions persist that it could cross the “red line” toward weaponization.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) attempted to rein in Iran’s uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Yet in 2018 the United States unilaterally withdrew, undermining the deal and prompting Iran to resume limited enrichment activities. Without the JCPOA’s constraints—and shielded by its non-NPT status—Iran’s nuclear ambitions have become both real and rhetorically charged, provoking Israeli pre-emptive strikes in June 2025 on Iranian sites.
Pre-emptive Strikes, Self-Defence, and Sovereignty
On 16 June 2025 Israel launched airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, citing “red-line” intelligence and existential threats. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, states may use force in self-defence against an “armed attack,” yet pre-emptive action—striking before an imminent assault—remains legally contested. Israel argues its strikes were necessary to prevent a first strike by Iran; Iran and its allies decry these as unlawful aggression.
Iran’s refusal to recognize Israel since 1979 and the latter’s policy of strategic ambiguity have fueled a climate of mutual hostility. Each side invokes self-defence, yet neither acknowledges the other’s right to exist. The result is a spiral of tit-for-tat attacks—and a broader danger that the Middle East could become a second theatre of the Russo-American confrontation.
Great-Power Alignments
Russia has denounced Israeli strikes on Iranian territory as “beyond evil” and warned against damage to the Bushehr nuclear plant, built and staffed by Russian engineers. China—Tehran’s largest oil customer—has echoed calls for de-escalation and insisted on Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology. Many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Iraq, condemn Israeli attacks, while Western powers rally behind Israel’s security concerns. This patchwork of alliances underscores how nuclear politics in the Middle East are enmeshed with global powerplay.
Legal and Normative Challenges
The NPT and PTBT established normative limits on testing and proliferation, but enforcement depends on Security Council unanimity—often blocked by the very nuclear-armed permanent members. Israel and the United States routinely bypass UN censure for strikes labeled “self-defence,” while Iran, outside the NPT, evades many treaty-based constraints. This selective application erodes the rule of law and fosters a “two-tier” system in which some states retain nuclear arsenals while others face punitive measures for enrichment efforts.
Moreover, the principle of pacta sunt servanda—treaties must be honored—seems inapplicable when major powers unilaterally withdraw from agreements such as the JCPOA. Without a universally accepted enforcement mechanism or genuine disarmament commitment, non-proliferation becomes a façade for power projection.
Prospects for De-escalation and Reform
Despite Secretary-General António Guterres’s plea to “give peace a chance,” and European efforts to revive diplomatic channels, neither Israel nor Iran appears ready to negotiate while strikes and counter-strikes continue. Iran demands unconditional Israeli cessation of aggression; Israel insists on halting Iran’s nuclear advances. In the absence of trust, third-party mediation seems unlikely.
Longer-term reform of the non-proliferation regime is imperative. Proposals range from expanding IAEA safeguards and creating a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to reforming the Security Council’s veto rules for proliferation cases. Only by addressing the underlying inequities—allowing some states de facto nuclear status while denying others—can the international community hope to break the cycle of mistrust and unilateral violence.
Conclusion
The current Israelo-Iranian confrontation exemplifies how nuclear non-proliferation norms have become entangled with geopolitical rivalries. The NPT’s lofty goals of disarmament and peaceful nuclear use falter when great-power politics prevail. To restore credibility, the United Nations and its member states must reaffirm the rule of law: universal adherence to treaty obligations, equitable enforcement, genuine disarmament by existing nuclear powers, and the creation of regional security frameworks. Without such measures, the specter of nuclear escalation—and the erosion of international peace—will continue to haunt the Middle East and beyond.
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